INTRODUCTION
Many modem research areas (e.g. the process industry) rely on advanced laboratory equipment, such as electron microscopes, mass spectrometers, equipment for surface analysis , and other analytical equipment. Effective use of this equipment during experiments and for production work requires complex infrastructure and the involvement of many specialists that may be distributed and span multiple organisations. Emerging Computer Grids and Web Services technologies provide a sound basis for extending Groupware, which has traditionally been used for collaborative applications to build a virtual collaborative environment. Such virtual laboratories offer the same possibilities as a traditional laboratory, however they also enable laboratory staff to utilise the equipment and expertise of third parties. Security services provide a reliable and secure operational environment that is capable of managing customers' and providers' resources. Protection of privacy and confidentiality is of particular importance when different parties share the same equipment.
This paper presents the experience of designing and developing an open, flexible, customer-driven security infrastructure for open collaborative applications in the framework of the Collaboratory.nl' project (CNL) . The work is largely based upon extended use of emerging Web Services and Computer Grid security technologies and the generic AAA authorisation framework [1, 2, 3, 4] .
Collaborative applications require a sophisticated, multi-dimensional security infrastructure that manages secure operation of user applications between multiple administrative-and trust domains. Typical Open Collaborative Environment (OCE) use cases requires that the collaborative environment:
Managing access based upon role-assigned privileges and policy enforcement are addressed in many collaborative and Computer Grids projects. The majority of known solutions and implementations [5, 6] use widely recognised Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [7] models as a general conceptual approach, and XACML [8] as an implementation basis. The current Grid Security Infrastructure and Authorisation framework evolved from using proprietary solutions such as the Community Authorisation Service (CAS), toward the use of a XACML-based Policy Management and Authorization Service, as seen in for the most recent Globus Toolkit 4.0 release [5, 6, 9, 10] . Although providing a good example of addressing similar tasks, current Grid based solutions don't provide all of the required functionality for the OCE. Their deep embedding into parallel task scheduling mechanisms prevents distributed execution of dissimilar computational tasks/jobs. The OCE is less coupled and mostly concerned with the allocation and execution of complex experiments on the equipment that for most use cases require human control and interaction during experiment.
Collaborative tools like Chef2, initially designed for online educational course management, can provide most of the necessary functionality for the creation of a collaborative environment. However, this environment needs to be extended such that it can be integrated with other stages and components of the collaborative organisation managing the experiment stages. These stages include the initial stage of order creation and the main experimental stage that requires secure access to the instrument or resource.
To address these specifics, the OCE security architecture proposes a novel Job-centric approach, which is uses the Job description as a semantic document, created on the basis of a signed order (or business agreement) [ I L, 12]. The document contains all the information required to run the analysis, including the Job ID, assigned users and roles, and a trust/security anchor(s) in the form of the resource and additionally the customer's digital signature. In general, such approach allows binding security services and policies to a particular job and/or resource. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents basic OCE use cases, the required security functionality and also introduces the proposed Job-centric security model. Section 3 describes the operation of the OCE security system which is built around the Job description as a semantic document defining security context for OCE security services operations. Section 4 provides more details about policy-based access control in the OCE, and discusses issues associated with combining multiple policies and multi-level access control enforcement. In addition, implementation suggestions are provided based upon CNL practical experience. Section 5 attempts to formalise the trust relations evident in an open distributed access control system, using the Job-centric security model and RBAC.
Finally, section 6 provides additional implementation details, describing the CNL Authorisation service which combines RBAC functionality with the generic AAA Authorisation framework. The CNL Authorisation service provides a good example of using XACML and SAML standards for Authorisation assertions and messaging.
The proposed approach and solutions are being developed to respond to both common and specific requirements of the CNL and EGEE3 projects. The approach and can also represent a typical OCE use case for the general Web Services and OGSA Security framework. It is expected that other project may stand to benefit from this work, as it proposes a general approach and common solutions for the security problems found in OCEs.
GENERAL OCE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND PROPOSED JOB-CENTRIC SECURITY MODEL
Security services are defined as the component of the OCE middleware that provides a secure infrastructure and environment for executing OCE tasks/jobs. Generally speaking, security services can be added to an already existing operational architecture, however current industry demand for very secure operational environments requires that the Security architecture is developed as an integral part of the system design. There should be also the possibility to define a security services profile at the moment of a system service invocation defined by a security policy.
For the purpose of analysing the required security functionality, the OCE use cases can be divided into two groups; simple security interactions and extended interactions. In a simple interaction use case, the major task is to securely provide remote access to instrument(s) that belong to a single provider. For this case, the remote site or the resource owner can provide few onsite services and allow distributed user groups. An extended use case must additionally allow distributed multi-site services, multiple user identities and attribute providers, and distributed job execution. In its own turn, multiple trust domains will require dynamic creation of user and resource federations/associations, handling different policies, specific measures for protecting data confidentiality and user/subject privacy in a potentially uncontrolled environment.
In both cases there is a need for the following functionality:
* fine-grained access control based upon user/subject attributes/roles and policies defined by a resource. * privilege/attribute management by a designated person holding responsibility for a particular experiment or job. * customer-managed/controlled security environment with the root of trust defined by a user/subject (or their private key). The security environment should also allow secure isolation of the execution of customer tasks on OCE facilities protected by the customercontrolled security key/credentials.
The above-listed requirements may be successfully addressed within the proposed job-centric approach to security services provisioning. Procedures in the OCE include two major stages as part of accepting and executing the order: negotiation and signing of the order (business part), plus performing the experiment (technical part). The Job description, as a semantic document, is created based upon the signed order and contains all information required to perform the experiment on the OCE infrastructure. The job description includes a Job ID, Job owner, assigned users and roles, and trust/security anchor(s) in the form of both resource and customer digital signatures. This kind of Job Description can be used as a foundation for creating a Virtual Organisation (VO) instance, as an association of designated users and resources which supports all "standard" security constructs such as users, groups, roles, trust domains, designated services and authorities [2, 13] . Figure I illustrates the structure of a Job Description and also its relation to other OCE components and security services.
The Job Description must include (or reference) the Job policy, which defines all aspects of the user, resource and trust management that should be take into account when executing the job. This policy should define the following items: * trusted users, VO's, resources and in general, trusted credentials (or trusted Certification Authorities); * delegation policy and identity federation/mapping policy (additionally); * privileges/permissions assigned to roles; * credit limits and conditions of use; * confidentiality and privacy requirements; * Job access control or authorisation policy. It is important to note that a Job policy may be combined with the Resource admission policy and in practice should not be more restrictive than the Resource policy. Otherwise, the Job security management service may reject some resources based upon Resource policy evaluation as a procedure of mutual authorisation.
Such a job-centric approach gives organizations complete flexibility in the creation of their security associations and services for their specific tasks or applications.
OCE SECURITY SYSTEM OPERATION
Each OCE has a need for basic security services: authentication (AuthN) and single-sign-on (SSO), policy based authorisation (AuthZ), information and data confidentiality and integrity, non-repudiation and privacy. Security services may be bound to and requested from any basic OCE service using a standard request/response format. Use of security services must be specified by the policy that provides a mapping between a request context (e.g., action requested by a particular subject on a particular resource) and resource functionality and access permissions. A binding between (basic) services and security services can be defined dynamically at the moment of service deployment or invocation using existing Web services and XML Security technologies for associating/attaching security services and policies to the service description [14, 15, 16] . Figure 2 illustrates the relations and interactions between major entities and processes in our Job-centric security model, including the actors/principals of the customer site and the services/(semantic) documents/entities of the resource site. For This section provides a high-level analysis of trust relations for the general Job-centric security model discussed in section 3 (see also Figure 2 ). The analysis is intended to provide recommendations for the required trust and policy authority relations, including relations between Resource, Policy and PDP trust domains and authorities, and requirements on key/credential distribution for the OCE security architecture.
For the purpose of analysis, Figure 2 combines the main components of the OCE access control infrastructure into groups that have the same level of trust and/or authority in respect to the decision-making process and its context. It is assumed that in the resource access control model, the root of trust belongs to the resource. The expression above can be read as follows: The user will have a final permission (to do an action), if s/he has a credential from the HomeOrg with attribute "staff', s/he is contained in the "members" list of the Job description, s/he is assigned a role in the members attribute list (may be a part of the Job Description or AA repository), and finally the user's designated role is assigned a "permission" to do an action. The final mapping between the roles and permissions is provided by the policy. To become a shared trust anchor between the resource and the customer domains, the Order (TA I) or Job Description (TA2) must contain mutually signed credentials/certificates. Although the main PEP operation will assume a pull authorisation decision request to the trusted PDP, in general it may accept the AuthzTicket from an external PDP belonging to the trusted domain.
USING SAML AND XACML FOR AUTHORISATION ASSERTIONS AND MESSAGING
The proposed Job-centric security model is being implemented in the CNL Authorisation service. CNL uses a proprietary Job Description format, which in the future can be mapped to two related formats: WS-Agreement [19] and Job Submission Description Language (JSDL) [20] 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The general OCE Security architecture and proposed solutions described in this paper are based on the practical experience we have gained whilst designing and developing an open collaborative environment within the Collaboratory.nl project. This paper presents findings that resulted from building a flexible, customer-driven security infrastructure for open collaborative applications, based on both the extended use of emerging Web Services and Computer Grid security technologies, and further application specific development of the generic AAA authorisation framework.
The CNL Security Architecture implements the proposed Job-centric approach that allows building basic CNL security services around the semantic Job Description document. The Job Description is created on the basis of signed order-and contains all the information required to run the experiment or execute the job. The Architecture enables security services such as user authentication, policy and role based access control, confidentiality and integrity of information and data.
The CNL Authorisation framework combines Web Services security mechanisms with the flexibility of the Generic AAA Architecture and XACML policy/role based access control model to build fine-grained access control. Separating policy definition from the authorisation enforcement simplifies access control management, which can be delegated to the resource owner. To reduce performance overhead when requesting authorisation decision from PDP, CNL implementation combines pull and push models by using authorisation ticket with the limited validity period that allows bypassing of the potentially slow request evaluation of the PDP.
The CNL project is being developed in coordination with the EGEE project; this will allow future use of the Grid infrastructure being developed in the framework of EGEE project and guarantee the compatibility of basic security services such as authentication, authorisation, and corresponding formats of metadata, policies, 
